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 “In this work, I have most attempted a full description of the many hellish 
torments and punishments those piratical sea-rovers invent and inflict on the unfortunate 
Christians who may by chance unhappily fall into their hands…”38 wrote John Foss, an 
American sailor captured by pirates off the coast of North Africa and sold into slavery in 
1793. Many other captives were not as reserved, describing the pirate’s bloody attacks 
with colorful, titillating language that provoked outrage in early America. Although often 
exaggerated or forged, the Orientalist stereotypes perpetuated about the Barbary Pirates 
by captives like John Foss would resonate in the minds of early Americans and shape 
American foreign policy. 
These first encounters with North Africa through the pirates set a precedent for 
how the young nation would engage with belligerent powers in the future. While 
European superpowers paid tribute and appeased the Barbary nations in order to 
incapacitate their economic rivals on the seas, the American Congress commissioned a 
naval fleet and prepared for war. The language used in the accounts of the Barbary 
captives, in the colonial American newspapers, and by the founding fathers demonstrates 
that the legend of the Barbary pirates shaped American views of “the Orient,” which led 
to acceptance of aggressive foreign policy in the Mediterranean. 
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John D. Foss. “Together with some account of the treatment of Christian Slaves When Sick: -- and 
Observations on the Manners and Customs of the Algerines.” (Newburyport, MA: A. March 1798) in Paul 
Baepler, ed. White Slaves, African Masters: An Anthology of American Barbary Captivity Narratives. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 73. 
If, as Marwan Obeidat claims, “the “Barbary pirates” affair sums up what 
Americans knew of the Muslim World until the 1970s,”39 then understanding what it was 
that the Americans thought they knew of the Muslim World becomes of utmost 
importance. Who were the Barbary pirates, and why did America go to war with them? 
This paper will offer an in-depth analysis of these fierce corsairs, purported “mor 
[sic] like ravones [sic] beasts then men,”40 and the circumstances surrounding their 
repeated conflicts with the early American Republic. I will explain the Barbary pirates 
and their governing regencies, and the nature of North African slavery, along with the 
contemporary conceptions of culture and religion. I will discuss the various experiences 
found in the captive narratives, as well as how the Orientalist language used in these 
exaggerated accounts shaped American opinions and policies regarding these Muslim 
corsairs. From this, it  becomes evident that the American public supported the military 
operations against the Barbary powers in the Tripolitan War of 1801 and the Algerine 
War of 1815 in part because of the constant and widespread inaccurate Orientalist and 
overtly racist portrayals of the North African corsairs. In dehumanizing the “other”, the 
writers of these narratives convinced the American public of the young nation’s need to 
assert itself and triumph over a barbarous oppressor, and heralded the stirrings of 
imperialism. 
 
 
 
I. The Barbary Pirates & Powers 
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The legend of the Barbary pirates is one shrouded in countless American-centered 
misnomers.
41 
Many of the negative stereotypes perpetuated by the eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century Americans persist today. Countless popular books written about the 
North African corsairs, for example, emphasize the “avowed Islamic” pirates who were 
part of “a medieval autocracy whose credo was piracy and terror,” and who “professed to 
despise Christians.” They compare the Barbary Powers to today’s modern terrorists, 
claiming that “while the Barbary War resembles today’s war on terror tactically and 
strategically, it resonates most deeply in its assertion of free trade, human rights, and 
freedom from tyranny and terror.”42 
As with most writing produced in “contact zones,”43 these anachronistic and grossly 
 
inaccurate views reveal more about America than they do about the history of the 
Barbary pirates. Similarly, while the early American captives’ narratives reflect the 
Barbary pirates’ cruelty, they are a more valuable evidence of European-American 
perceptions of North African Islamic culture. Therefore, while this paper will discuss the 
Barbary pirates, the purpose is to understand how misguided stereotypes of the past 
influenced early America’s aggressive foreign policy towards the Barbary powers. 
I will take a moment here to explain the terms that crop up repeatedly in this essay. 
“Barbary” was the accepted British and American all-purpose term used for the entirety 
of the North African region, excluding Egypt. Ann Thompson maintains that “…it is 
possible to discern a set of attitudes and reactions concerning Barbary in general. It was 
41 
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felt to possess a certain unity, despite the differences which were seen to exist between the 
different Regencies…”44 The term does not acknowledge the diverse people of this broad 
region:  Arabs, Berbers, Jews, Moriscoes, expatriate Europeans, Levantines, 
Turkish/Ottoman soldiers, and other various tribal people.
45 
Despite the problematic 
nature of the term, it is used often in both the primary and secondary sources, and so I use 
it as well to avoid confusion. 
The term “pirate” in this context is also controversial. Pirates of all sorts had been 
pillaging ships and making slaves of the crew and passengers onboard for as long as 
people have sailed on the Mediterranean. “For centuries, the normal occupation of 
thousands of men in the Mediterranean was to set sail from their home ports in order to 
attack the shipping or the coastal regions of the area.”46 The Barbary corsairs were a 
fraction of the various people making their fortunes through plunder rather than through 
trade, and Paul Baepler points out that “the Barbary corsairs themselves originated in part 
from the need to defend North Africa from European aggression.”47 
Contrary to the popular understanding of the term “Barbary pirate,” the men on 
 
the North African ships were more privateers or corsairs, than pirates. They were part of 
several organized governmental systems, and were bound under their regencies’ strict 
laws. They were not free to plunder indiscriminately, and were often called upon by their 
ruling regencies to function as naval powers. As Peter Earle points out about the typical 
Barbary corsair: “In his own world, he was no outlaw.”48 Instead of understanding the 
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corsairs to be privateers of their respective regencies or nations, as most European powers 
did, the Americans called them pirates, drawing an inaccurate comparison to the 
terrifying cutthroat freebooters of the Caribbean who operated under no laws save their 
own. 
The Barbary pirates were also not a homogenous group. Linda Colley points out 
that the whole area of North Africa was somewhat of a puzzle to Americans. The 
Muslims there were multicultural, urban, commercial, monotheistic, literate, and 
somewhat light-skinned.
49 
At the time America went to War with Tripoli in 1801 and 
later with Algiers in 1815, the North African coast was divided into several different 
regencies and kingdoms, each an inheritor of a separate and distinct culture. Morocco 
was its own kingdom, while Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli were semi-autonomous regencies 
held in the Ottoman Empire through feudal-style alliances.
50 
They functioned as separate 
 
entities; much like the countries of Europe did, and descended from different tribes. Each 
regency and kingdom had its own ruler, set of laws and customs, and its own corsairs. 
They declared war separately, and negotiated peace treaties separately. This meant that, 
in theory, only the corsairs of the regency or kingdom at war with America would pose a 
threat to American ships and shipping. 
To understand the motivations for Barbary corsairing, it is important to understand 
the differences between the American and the North African economies. While 
previously, both European and Barbary corsairs raided one another’s ships and the 
Mediterranean coastlines, 
The Industrial Revolution, which was beginning to transform the face of 
Europe, sent scarcely a ripple to the shores of North Africa. The seizure of 
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prizes and the enslavement of captives remained an essential if anachronist 
prop of its still primitive economies.
51
 
 
So while America transitioned from widespread illicit commerce and privateering to more 
of what they understood to be legitimate trade, the North African economies were still 
mainly agricultural, and propped up by preying on the vessels of other nations. In addition 
to this, the “great majority of people in the Mediterranean lived under conditions of 
extreme poverty,” so the allure of being a Barbary corsair, a “professional hunter in 
pursuit of sanctioned quarry,” was great. It was the only profession available in North 
Africa where a pauper could become rich enough to afford the kinds of possessions and 
lifestyles only government employees could have.
52
 
To recap, the term “Barbary pirate” was a blanket term invented by Europeans 
with a poor understanding of the variety of people and cultures present in the North 
African Mediterranean. As so many of the sources utilize this term, this essay will 
continue to name the various corsairs of Morocco, Tripoli, Algiers and Tunis as Barbary 
pirates/corsairs to avoid confusion. These corsairs worked for their respective rulers, 
(called deys, beys, and bashaws/pashas) selectively and legally incapacitating the vessels 
of the nations on which their ruler declared war. The corsairs were “Operating within the 
limits of then current international practice, much like their contemporaries in America, 
Britain, France, Holland, Italy and Malta, among other places.”53 
 
In fact, Europe allowed the Barbary States to operate under the policy of tribute 
and encouraged the plundering corsairs. Every year, each ruler of the regencies or 
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Morocco reviewed its status with the other nations that participated in Mediterranean 
shipping. The deys, beys, and pashas would demand tribute from each European state. 
This tribute would serve as insurance; every state that paid the asking price would be 
guaranteed a year free of attacks upon its ships. Usually, the price was less than the cost 
of equipping a naval fleet for war against the Barbary powers, and most nations chose to 
pay. 
Each country felt that as long as their ships and their nationals were 
protected from the depredations of the corsairs, then the fact that the ships 
and nationals of other countries were captured could only be to their 
advantage, in that it hindered the development of rival merchant marines.
54
 
 
Clissold points out that the Barbary rulers found it wiser to look for smaller prey that 
could not so easily afford the tribute. Nations like Denmark, Sweden, and the newly 
formed American republic were preferred targets.
55 
While the American colonies were 
still under British rule, their ships flew the British Union Jack, and were protected under 
Britain’s treaty with the various Barbary powers. However, “American problems with 
these four governments began almost from the moment of independence.”56 Barbary 
powers began demanding tribute from the American ex-colonies, and while America 
made up its mind as to how to deal with the Barbary threat, the pirates plundered 
American ships, and captured and enslaved the Americans onboard. 
George Washington believed that Britain sought to keep America dependent, and 
welcomed Barbary attacks on American vessels.
57 
A letter from M. Salva (the secretary 
of the imperial agent in Barbary) to Benjamin Franklin also notes this suspicion: “…and 
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the politics of certain European powers do not restrain them from paying tribute to enjoy 
peace; they make use of these human harpies as a terror to the belligerent nations.”58 
Linda Colley agrees. Not only did Britain relish the Barbary pirates stamping out her 
economic competitors, but “without the aid of Barbary, Britain could never have 
maintained is Mediterranean empire.”59 
Most European communities worked out ways of financing the tribute, or collecting 
 
sufficient funds to buy back, or redeem their captured kin from slavery in North Africa. 
For example, the German cities of Hamburg and Lübeck financed the Sklavenkasse 
(literal translation: “Slave bursary”) from a tax on shipping so that there would always be 
funds available for redeeming prisoners. Swedish sailors paid a portion of their earnings 
into a kitty that functioned in a similar way to the Sklavenkasse.
60 
I use these examples to 
show that Europe had a long history of negotiating with the Barbary pirates and their 
rulers, either by paying the tribute necessary to guarantee safety, or mitigating the 
circumstances of the Barbary attacks. 
Europe’s refusal to collectively stamp out the Barbary threat can be understood within 
context. While the Barbary pirates were a nuisance, they did not devastate Mediterranean 
trade. In the 1790s, for example, the Barbary pirates captured fewer than thirty ships. 
During this time France was undergoing its own Revolution, and French privateers 
captured 300 vessels.
61 
During the American Revolution just a few decades before, 
America relied heavily on privateering to weaken Great Britain and to plunder 
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desperately needed supplies to sustain the war. The Barbary pirates committed the same 
acts as John Paul Jones, for example, who was hailed as America’s greatest 
Revolutionary naval hero and promoted to admiral. The Barbary pirates, too, had 
permission from their governments to plunder vessels of those powers they were at war 
with, and like the American or French privateers, they always gave their governments a 
predetermined share of the loot.
62
 
 
Frank Lambert points out that merchants and pirates came from different historical 
and cultural assumptions about how the world operated. For the deys, beys, and pashas in 
control of the various North African regencies, operating under a tribute system was a 
fair way to finance nations. Both the United States and the Barbary powers wanted stable 
economies, and each side operated under their own cultural assumptions to try to achieve 
this for themselves: Americans through more free trade and commerce, and coastal North 
Africans through agriculture and wartime spoils.
63 
Despite this shift in the American 
economy, Americans still condoned privateering as a legitimate act of warfare, just as 
early modern Europe and North Africa did. 
 
 
 
II. The Accounts of White Slaves in North Africa 
 
The eighteenth and nineteenth century American and North African economies also 
had in common a dependence on slave labor. Slavery in North Africa provided diverse 
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experiences for the enslaved. Slavery was a traditional institution of most Islamic 
civilizations, as well as in the Americas. According to Muslim law, no Muslim could 
enslave another. The majority of slaves in Barbary therefore consisted of Africans from 
the interior of the continent, or Europeans and Americans captured on enemy ships. The 
Barbary pirates attacked European and American ships, instead of one another, because 
white Christian slaves were the most profitable cargo.
64
 
Christian slaves captured in this way had very diverse experiences as slaves in 
North Africa. Those Christians with status or from wealthy families were often bought 
from the Barbary pirates at the North African slave markets for the specific purpose of 
holding out for ransom from families or governments. While the Christians waited for 
their freedom, they were put to work to earn their keep and make profit for their masters. 
This could mean any number of things: rowing on the galleys, working on a chain gang 
performing construction work, or using their skills (sailing, literacy, sewing, 
mathematics, etc.) to do more specialized work. “Barbary economy and society rested on 
slavery, and slaves could be found in practically every occupation.”65 
 
Humphrey Fisher, in his study of slavery in Muslim Africa found that while the 
Barbary corsairs took slaves from the ships they preyed on in the Mediterranean or 
Atlantic, Christian whites were a very small minority of the types of slaves taken for 
ransom.
66   
They were considered prisoners-of-war, and could be ransomed and redeemed, 
or sent home if a peace was signed between their country and the enslaving regency. If 
they converted to Islam, they could rise to high social and political positions within the 
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state. The white slaves from the Levant (Georgians and Circassians) were regarded more 
as “objects of commerce” and not prisoners, so while they couldn’t look forward to 
repatriation, they were still able to rise in rank. The black slaves marched up from the 
African interior had the worst circumstances, and were rarely eligible for social 
mobility.
67 
Despite this, the loudest slave voices from North Africa are those of the 
Europeans and Americans captured by the Barbary Pirates. Their accounts remain 
behind, and from them, we have a good idea of what their experiences in North Africa 
were like. 
Some of the Christian American slaves experienced tremendous hardships, hunger, 
and felt that they were left to “rely on the mercy of sanguinary barbarians.”68 They were 
often confined to long hours of harsh, physical labor, and subsisted off of a limited diet of 
coarse bread, vinegar, and olives. They slept in overcrowded bagnios
69 
and were 
vulnerable to harsh corporal punishment by arbitrary drivers for minor infractions. 
Because of these conditions, they were the most susceptible to communicable diseases, 
and many died before returning home. 
Peter Earle reminds us that in North African slavery, “Horrors there certainly were, 
but life could be pleasant, as well.”70 Other white Christian slaves had better experiences 
in captivity. Earle found evidence of some slaves that did so well in Barbary that they did 
not want to return home. They had the option of converting and then were free to live as 
any North African Muslim would. They could marry, hold titles, and bequeath their 
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fortunes to their Muslim children. The slave not wishing to convert could succeed in 
business, pay off his ransom, and continue as a free Christian merchant. Some slaves 
even became Barbary corsairs themselves, opting for the risky, yet opportunistic lifestyle. 
Two captives, Dr. Cowdery and William Ray both mention a “renegado Scotchman”71 by 
the name of Lysle/Lysh, who converted to Islam, took the Tripolitan name of Murad 
Rais, married the Bey Jussef Bashaw’s sister, and worked as a Barbary corsair for the 
regency. 
Several of the slave narratives mention certain freedoms despite their slave status. If a 
slave did have the money or leisure, he was free to enjoy the amenities of the city, “he 
could make use of those institutions as freely as any Turk or Moor.”72 Dr. Cowdery, for 
example, was treated reasonably because his medical skills had saved the Bashaw’s son. 
He enjoyed a varied diet including North African treats like dried fruits and nuts, and was 
permitted to wander the marketplaces and purchase “figs, watermelons, muskmelons, and 
cucumbers,” in addition to being “plentifully supplied with squashes and cucumbers” and 
being treated to food “prepared in the Turkish style” that was “simple and good.”73 
William Ray, who served on the same ship as Dr. Cowdery, had a significantly more 
 
difficult time in his enslavement. Nevertheless, he also enjoyed some freedoms. He talks 
about his fellow sailors in the bagnios “who had the good fortune to save a little money, 
were permitted to go to the market, to purchase vegetables.” At another point, they were 
led through a courtyard with 
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a dozen beautiful females, who came from the piazzas above. As the 
women in the streets are constantly wrapped and muffled up in blankets, 
which conceal their shapes and faces, except one eye, this to us, was a 
novel sight; for the ladies were exposed to view, as much as the half-naked 
belles of our own towns. They were fantastically wrapped in loose robes 
of striped silk; their arms necks and bosoms bare…They brought us dates, 
olives, oranges and milk.
74
 
American sailor James Leander Cathcart, who served on an American privateering 
vessel during the Revolutionary War, was another slave whose experiences in Barbary 
were not all negative. Cathcart thrived in North Africa, and in his eleven years as a slave 
in Algiers, he became an entrepreneur. He owned taverns in the bagnios, financed 
maritime adventures, and obtained the enviable paid position of Chief Christian Secretary 
to the Algerian dey. In his position, he was able to help resolve diplomatic crises between 
Algiers and America, and intervene on behalf of the other American slaves. After 
negotiating his release, Cathcart voluntarily returned to North Africa as the US Consul to 
Tripoli and Tunis. A similar thing had happened earlier, in 1690, where Rene Lemaire, a 
French slave in Algiers was nominated acting consul and acted as a go-between for Dey 
Cha’ban of Algiers and King Louis XIV.75 
 
There are no doubts that most white slaves taken by the Barbary pirates and enslaved 
in North Africa yearned for their freedom and homeland, at least at first. Nevertheless, 
“…both white and black slaves in North Africa lived more diverse lives, and sometimes 
much freer lives, than the majority of plantation slaves in the Caribbean or American 
South.”76 Slavery in North Africa and in the New World (the Americas) cannot be 
likened at all. Baepler makes the point that “on the surface, the Barbary Captivity 
narrative appears to invert the situation of the American slave narrative by presenting the 
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testimony of a white slave under African domination rather than a black slave subjugated 
by a white owner,”77 but the basis for comparison is spurious at best. North African 
slavery was not institutionalized chattel slavery like in the plantations of the Americas. 
The white slaves in Barbary were not born into captivity or taken from their homeland, 
and many had the option of returning to their previous lives, whereas a black Anglo- 
American slave, even if freed, did not have that option. Richard Parker points out that 
Americans “found the concept of white Americans being enslaved outrageous, even 
though they were engaged in the slave trade themselves.”78 
With this understanding of the Barbary pirates, the regencies they worked for, the 
 
type of activities they were involved with, and slavery in Muslim North Africa along the 
Barbary Coast, we can move to the American and European captivity narratives
79
. I will 
explain the types of narratives the American public was exposed to in the several decades 
leading up to the Tripolitan and Algerine Wars. 
The captivity narratives captured a wide variety of experiences, as the white 
slave’s experiences in North Africa were incredibly diverse. By the 1620s, the Barbary 
captivity narrative had begun to establish itself as a recognizable genre in Europe. The 
Barbary narratives gained height of popularity during the American Revolution in 
America, and were soon thereafter compared with black American slave narratives, like 
that of Frederick Douglass
80
. They were usually published in broadsides, pamphlets, 
 
almanacs, or as short novels, but the occasional poem or newspaper article also brought 
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the Barbary captivity genre to an American audience. In the Pennsylvania Gazette, early 
America’s most prominent newspaper, there are several instances of books about the 
Barbary pirates or the North African regencies and kingdoms, printed in Britain, for sale 
in the colonies. For example, in May 30, 1751, there is a notice in the newspaper about a 
list of books imported in the ship Wandsworth by Capt. Smith, to be sold by David Hall 
in the post office. Among the list is a book called History of the Pyratical States of 
Barbary. 
81
 
Many of the captivity accounts were published multiple times in different places. 
Dr. Cowdery published excerpts of his journal in several newspapers, and Baepler 
speculates that it was because of their favorable reception that he was encouraged to 
publish the condensed version of his journal in 1806.
82 
The account of sailor Robert 
Adams was “the most international narrative of all the Barbary captivity narratives,” with 
editions appearing in London, Boston, Paris, Stockholm, and Amsterdam. Baepler found 
several comments of the account peppered in various magazines.
83 
The account of Maria 
Martin was published in eleven editions over the course of just over a decade.
84 
In total, 
the American narratives would eventually appear in over 100 editions and in several 
languages. From these facts, and from the articles and commentary that appeared in 
newspapers as the Pennsylvania Gazette, it is certain that the majority of early Americans 
would have been aware of, and outraged by the actions of the Barbary pirates. 
 
Paul Baepler discovered further evidence of the widespread awareness of the 
 
Barbary pirates: In 1693 five New Yorkers were reported captured by the Barbary 
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Pirates. The governor intervened and publicized a collection. The governor and churches 
were able to collect 400 pounds sterling from 4,302 contributors. The report later turned 
out to be a fabrication, but “the highly public nature of these solicitations and the number 
of contributors to the redemption of captives assures us that the story of Barbary piracy 
was widely disseminated.”85 In the 1790s, Congress fashioned a ploy to deceive the 
Barbary states into thinking that congress was prepared to sacrifice some citizens for the 
honor of the nation. Increasing numbers of Americans demanded freedom for the 
hostages, and “by 1794, public pressure caused congress to abandon this ploy and make 
freeing slaves a priority.”86 
Because those slaves that did make it back to America were usually left destitute 
 
from paying back their ransom, “one of the ways in which they could restore their 
 
fortunes was to publish their tales, in the hope of earning a few shillings.”87 These stories, 
although eyewitness accounts, invariably must have sold better if embellished for the 
audience.  Baepler points out that most writers of these fantastic tales referred to previous 
captivity narratives and what had already been written about Africa for advice on how to 
construct their accounts.
88
 
Due to this newfound popularity, several fictional captivity narratives began to 
 
surface, and some, like that of Maria Martin, were passed off as nonfiction at the time of 
their publication and dissemination for profit. As Baepler advocates: “If the fictional was 
sometimes read as true, then fiction helped to shape history, and we need to view these 
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narratives side by side.”89 They are equally useful in describing the impact the Barbary 
pirates had on the American psyche. The fictional and forged accounts have much to tell 
us about how the American public at large conceived of the Barbary pirates, and of 
Africans. Furthermore, the presence of fictional accounts attests to the demand for the 
Barbary captivity narratives, and demonstrates that the American audience was hungry 
for more details of the exotic “Other”. 
 
 
 
III. Orientalism and the Depiction of the North African Piratical “Other” 
 
Peter Earle remarks that “Epithets such as ruthless, cruel, debauched or sadistic 
are commonplace in the descriptions of pirates or corsairs in popular novels.”90 They are 
repeated, in one form or another, throughout all of the captivity narratives. In fact, the 
repetition of stereotypes is the one thing the varied narratives all have in common. Parker 
points out that “fabrication, exaggeration, and ignorance, not to mention ingrained 
stereotyping” were a part of every Barbary captivity narrative.91 The accounts “were 
never simply stories about individuals under stress, but commentaries on, and by- 
products of changing power relations over time.”92 
The narratives also served as some of America’s first impressions of Islamic 
 
Africa. They were riddled with certain myths that reinforced the negative Orientalist 
stereotypes. Before discussing the various myths perpetuated by the language in the 
Barbary captivity narratives, an explanation of Edward Said’s Orientalism, and how the 
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concept applies to the accounts written by the European and American captives of the 
 
Barbary pirates will prove useful. 
 
Edward Said’s theories on Orientalism were and still are some of the most 
influential ideas regarding Western dialogue about the Middle East. His work is ground- 
breaking and controversial, and started an entire discourse about how cultures perceive 
one another amidst unequal power relations.  His book, Orientalism, describes the 
ignorant assumptions and stereotypes that pervade the Western attitude towards the 
Middle East, and the prejudices and actions that occurred as a result of these misguided 
stereotypes. His main point is that the imperialistic and colonizing behaviors of Europe 
and later, the United States, can be explained through the ways these deep-seated 
assumptions and stereotypes were made to justify imperial expansion. In other words, 
Europeans and Americans remained ignorant regarding the Middle East and Islamic 
Culture (which they have traditionally grouped together as simply “the Orient”), and 
based their assumptions on a series of stereotypes which later helped them to justify the 
brutalities of empire-building. 
Edward Said mentions the Barbary pirates as part of the limited American 
experience of the Orient.
93 
The Orient itself, he argues, was almost a European invention, 
and had been “since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and 
landscapes, remarkable experiences.”94 European culture (and here I include early 
America because they were a colony of Britain for a great part of their awareness of the 
Barbary pirates) managed and produced the orient and gained in strength by defining 
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itself in opposition to the Orient.
95 
This is why the Barbary narratives of Europeans and 
Americans captured by the pirates say more about early modern Europe and America and 
Western intentions regarding the Orient, than they do about the Barbary pirates and their 
culture. 
Said explains that the relationship between the Orient and the Western powers 
(Europe and America) was one that was never equal, and always about power and 
domination. The West was able to construct its own identity as a superior one in 
comparison with Eastern people and cultures. He argues that European and American 
interest was always political, from the start of interaction. Said explains that 
While it is true to say that the United States did not in fact become a world 
empire until the twentieth century, it is also true that during the nineteenth 
century the United States was concerned with the Orient in ways that 
prepared for its later, overtly imperial concern.
96
 
 
 
 
This means that Orientalism functions as the exchange between the individual writers of 
the texts about the Orient (in this case, the authors of the captive narratives) and the 
political concerns shaped by the “three great empires” (Britain, France, America).97 
These concerns were largely imperial and determined by Western expansion in search of 
 
markets, resources and colonies. In the denunciations of Barbary, Americans could see 
the North African cultures in terms of backwardness and immorality. By projecting this 
divide between East and West, or between themselves and North Africa, it became 
justifiable to invade and dominate. Mary Louise Pratt agrees that accounts by Westerners 
about non-European parts of the world created the domestic subjects of imperialism. Pratt 
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agrees that these types of writings later legitimized the Western aspirations of economic 
expansion and empire.
98
 
So although America could not yet be considered an “empire” in the early stages 
of the republic, it had inherited the European, primarily British ideas and attitudes 
towards non-Europeans, and non-whites. Therefore, everything Americans wrote or read 
of the Orient, or the Barbary Coast, in this example, was written from this viewpoint. 
This viewpoint caused the American and European writers to generalize, stereotype, and 
denigrate the Orient and its people in their accounts. My argument is that this 
phenomenon of Western writings about the Barbary pirates and powers reinforced the 
stereotypes Americans believed about North Africa and the Muslim corsairs of the 
Barbary Coast. The acceptance of these Orientalist stereotypes led to the dehumanization 
of these people in the American mind, and to public acceptance of the Tripolitan and the 
Algerian wars. 
With this understanding of Orientalism, I will point out the most pervasive 
stereotypes perpetuated in the captivity accounts available in America, so that it becomes 
evident how the types of Orientalist language used by the Western writers in describing 
the Barbary pirates shaped the unfavorable impressions Americans had of Islamic North 
Africa. I will then point out various examples from the Pennsylvania Gazette about how 
these unfavorable impressions can be traced in one of America’s major newspapers, and 
conclude the essay by showing how these ideas connect to America’s foreign wartime 
policy towards Tripoli and Algiers. 
Frank Lambert points out that Americans tried to make sense of North Africa by 
exploring the differences between the United State and the Barbary Pirates. In the 
98 
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captivity narratives, American ideals were often pitted against the stereotypical views of 
the people of the Barbary Coast: lawless versus lawful, free trade versus the tribute 
system, freedom versus tyranny, Protestantism verses Islam. The narratives “singled out 
the most despicable pirate behavior and compared it with the loftiest American ideals… 
the United States was locked in a struggle of liberty versus tyranny and good versus 
evil.”
99 
Therefore, the same types of ideas and language crop up in nearly all of the 
 
captivity narratives. 
 
One of the first pervading myths that can be found over and over again in the 
captivity narratives is that all non-European or non-Americans are “barbaric”, and that all 
“Barbarians” are the same. Take, for example, an excerpt from John Foss, the sailor 
whose account this essay opened with: 
The turks are a well built robust people, their complexion not unlike 
Americans, tho’ somewhat larger, but their dress, and long beards, make 
them appear more like monsters than human beings.
100
 
 
Foss was captured off the coast of Algiers. Undoubtedly, there were some ethnically 
Turkish people of the Ottoman Empire present, but Foss referred to everyone in the area 
as if they were Turkish, indicating that he could not tell apart the various peoples residing 
in Algiers. From the extract, it is also apparent that his criteria for what qualifies as a 
“human being” is decidedly Anglo-centric, and those that do not conform are portrayed 
as “monsters.” The dehumanization of the Algerians due to Orientalist ideas is strongly 
evident. Thomas Pellow’s earlier account from the 1730s is similar. He wrote: “The 
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enemy seemed to me as monstrous ravenous creatures, which made me cry out “Oh 
 
Master! I am afraid they will kill us and eat us!”101 
 
Another indicator of American captives’ belief that non-Westerners were barbaric 
and all the same was the presence of constant derogatory comparisons between various 
North Africans and Native Americans.  Dr. Cowdery, for example, wrote 
Marriages are proclaimed in Tripoli, by one or two old women, who run 
through the streets, making a most hideous yelling, and frequently 
clapping their hands to their mouths, similar to the American Indians in 
their pow wows.
102
 
 
 
 
William Ray was onboard the same ship as Dr. Cowdery when captured by the Barbary 
pirates. He makes a similar disparaging comparison to a woman he encountered in his 
captivity: 
In the morning, about eight o’clock, an old sorceress came to see us. She 
had the complexion of a squaw, bent with age, ugly by nature, and 
rendered frightfully by art.
103
 
 
 
 
The language implies not only that all non-Europeans are the same (that is, barbarous and 
uncivilized), but that Europeans/Americans are superior to the “savage.” 
This rhetoric evokes the same types of derogatory language as that surrounding 
Indian Wars. America at this time was expanding Borders and commercial realms across 
the continent, and Christopher Castiglia in his analysis of Native American captivity 
narratives discovered that asserting the inferiority of Native American cultures suggested 
that Americans did not need to feel guilty for exterminating them.
104 
Early Americans 
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developed a similar idea in these comparisons of the Barbary powers with the Native 
Americans; in denigrating them, they could justify the wars that Europe was unwilling to 
fight. 
Another theme that most of the captivity narratives share is the portrayal of the 
Barbary pirates as capricious, childlike, and cruel. In Maria Martin’s account, she 
describes the pirates as “barbarians” who “began their favorite work, cutting maming 
[sic] and literally butchering, all that they found on deck.”105 Take also the narrative of 
Dr. Cowdery who describes actions of the pirates: 
After the flat of the Philadelphia was struck, and the officers and crew 
were awaiting the pleasure of their new masters, the Tripolitan chiefs 
collected their favourites, and, with drawn sabers, fell to cutting and 
slashing their own men, who were stripping the Americans and plundering 
the ship. The cut off the hands of some, and it is believed several were 
killed. After this battle amongst themselves was a little over, we were 
ordered into the boats to be carried on the shore.
106
 
 
 
 
William Ray, his crewmate denies Cowdery’s accusations that there were amputations 
and deaths in the infighting that occurred among the Barbary corsairs when they were 
captured. He wrote 
It is true there was a sort of mutiny and clashing of arms amongst them; 
but for my part I never saw any hands amputated, nor do I believe there 
were any lives lost.
107
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Dr. Cowdery made many such judgments about the Barbary pirates and the North 
Africans in Tripoli. Another excerpt of his journal, however, demonstrates that he was at 
the least as guilty as they of cruelty: 
August 5. The American squadron anchored off Tripoli. I was ordered to 
dress the wound of a Mameluke, who had his hand shattered by a bursting 
of a blunderbuss. I amputated all his fingers but one, with a dull knife, and 
dressed them in a bungling manner, in hopes of losing my credit as a 
surgeon in this part of the country, for I expected to have my hands full of 
wounded Turks in consequence of the exploits of my brave countrymen.
108
 
 
 
 
A third common stereotype the slave narratives share is the assumption that Islam 
itself is antiquated, barbaric, backward, or somehow the reason for the Barbary pirates’ 
plundering behaviors. William Ray appeared surprised at the kindness of the religious 
figures (“Mahometan saints of Anchorites,”) who “offered me a piece of bread in the 
name of the prophet, pitied my situation, and really appeared to possess philanthropy.”109 
This antagonism is also apparent in the narrative of Francis Brooks, an Englishman held 
 
captive in Morocco. The account was reprinted in Boston for the colonial American 
public. He wrote about his “confinement among those barbarous savages... whose 
Religion was composed of cruelty, whose customs were extravagant, and whose usages 
almost intolerable…”110 
These quotes shed more light on the American views of Islam, and the corsairs, 
 
than on the religion itself. Frank Lambert points out that in America’s struggle against the 
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Barbary powers, they made a larger point to denounce religious and civil oppression. 
Islam became equated to Catholicism as tyrannical, and in opposition to the Protestant 
American values of freedom.
111 
However, in the various treaties signed between the US 
and the North African powers, America makes no such references to Protestantism or 
God, while Morocco does define itself as an Islamic state through references to Allah.
112
 
While there was an antagonism between Christianity and Islam centuries before 
 
and during the Crusades and again during the Reconquista when Muslims and Christians 
were in more direct competition
113, by the late eighteenth century, “cynicism and greed 
had replaced religious enthusiasm” in the antagonism between the two religions. 114 “One 
American captive concluded in the 1790s that money was the Algerine god, that the 
pirates were far more interested in taking prizes than in waging holy war.”115 
Islam actually had very little to do with the Barbary pirates’ actions. As 
aforementioned, they plundered Christian ships not because of holy war (jihad), but 
because according to Koranic law, other Muslims could not be enslaved in this way. “The 
greater knowledge of Islam that is apparent in the Eighteenth Century ended in a 
strengthening of the most bigoted Christian stereotypes, accompanied by general 
ignorance and a refusal to understand.”
116 
The pointed aversion to all things Islamic 
 
within the captivity narratives contributed to the gradual dehumanization of the Barbary 
powers and their corsairs. 
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Fuad Sha’ban asserts that “America developed a definite Orientalist cultural 
attitude from its beginning…”117   As the American nation emerged, and the young 
republic was flooded with nationalism and ideals as Americans tried to define themselves 
as separate from Great Britain, the Barbary pirates encroached on the American 
periphery. The first tendency for Americans was to define the North Africans in direct 
opposition to how they defined themselves. Sha’ban also points out that the United States 
was also experiencing a religious revival, and that these two factors “were vital in 
shaping America’s attitude to and treatment of the “others.”
118
 
 
 
 
 
IV Following the Orientalist Language in the Pennsylvania Gazette 
 
The antagonistic language used to describe the Barbary pirates and 
regencies/kingdoms in the captivity narratives also surfaced in the Pennsylvania Gazette. 
It is revealing that in the 1750s, with the Tripolitan and Algerine Wars fifty or more years 
away, the language concerning the Barbary pirates is predominately neutral, and the 
corsairs are mentioned with impartiality. The tone of the articles is that of imparting 
news, and little more. As the conflicts with the corsairs escalates, and more Americans 
become aware of the incidents between their kinsmen and the North African pirates, the 
language begins to mimic that of the slave narratives. 
From 1750 to 1785, the Pennsylvania Gazette is filled with reports about the 
Barbary corsairs and their regencies. The Christmas edition of 1758, for example, 
mentions that the last letters from Barbary reported of two English vessels being taken by 
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the corsairs off the coast of Sale (Sallee). The current letter was written to inform the 
 
American colonies that 
 
the Emperor… is greatly incensed at the taking these Vessels, and that he 
had sent an Alcayde, with a Party of Horse, to bring in Chains the two 
Captains of the Cruizers [sic] who took them; that he intended to write a 
Letter to Lord Hume… assuring him that these Captures were contrary to 
his Orders, and that he will chastise his Captains; for that he is perfectly 
inclined to keep Peace and Friendship with us.
119
 
 
Another letter published in 1763 mentions the corsairs engaged in plunder. The language 
is also decidedly neutral: 
Captain Shearman Clarke, arrived here last Week from Teneriffe, in 35 
Days Passage, and advises, That the Trade there has been for some Time 
much infested by three Barbary Corsairs, viz. Two Chebecks and a Galley, 
who had made many Captures, and continued to take all Vessels they met 
with, that were not provided with a Mediterranean Pass.
120
 
 
In the mid 1780s, however, the letters and articles in the Pennsylvania Gazette 
begin to reflect the type of language found in the captivity narratives. The edition of 1786 
marks the first time the sea-rovers off the coast of North Africa are referred to in the 
newspaper as “pirates” instead of corsairs. After 1786, the term “Barbary pirate” appears 
with regularity. This marks a change in the American perception of these men. Corsair 
implies a legal, state-sanctioned status, while pirate once again draws parallels between 
the cut-throat outlaws of the Caribbean who could be hung at will by sheer virtue of 
being a pirate. The shift in terminology reflected a very real shift in the way Americans 
viewed the pirates, from men that had to be treated honorably (privateers) to men that 
could be violently terminated (pirates). 
Another comparison that paves the way for the justification of subjugating and 
dominating the Barbary powers was that between the Barbary corsairs and the Native 
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Americans. There are several instances where the Barbary corsairs are compared to the 
“savages of the frontier”, implying that non-Europeans/Americans are all barbarous, and 
all similar, and all deserve the same bloody fate. An entry from March 22, 1786 reads: 
…and rescue it from the predatory invasions of the Barbary states. The 
hostile conduct of the savages on our frontiers - the unexampled behaviour 
of our late enemy, in holding our posts contrary to the treaty, bridling the 
country, and depriving us of the advantages which would otherwise arise 
from it; and above all, that due and sacred regard which a nation ought 
ever to pay to her engagements…121 
 
Another entry from 1794 makes a similar comparison: “Our savage enemies in the 
 
Western Territory, and on the coasts of Barbary, are evils of the most painful nature…”122 
 
An entry in the summer of 1800 contains an indirect comparison that nevertheless carries 
the same implications as the others: 
Yet this, to the disgrace of our country, has been the case; we have been 
obliged to sacrifice treasure to purchase peace with the powers of Barbary, 
and to redeem our citizens there from slavery; we have been at great 
charge in sustaining a long and expensive Indian war, and in the protection 
of our frontiers; we have suffered immensely by the plunder of our 
commerce; we have fortified our ports and harbours; we have replenished 
or magazines; and we have created a very considerable navy.
123
 
 
Again, it becomes apparent that the Barbary pirates were perceived as the same 
type of impediment to American “progress” as the Native Americans. In reflecting the 
language of the captivity narratives, the articles in the Pennsylvania Gazette draw 
parallels between the Barbary corsairs and the pirates of the Caribbean as well as the 
Native Americans. This implies that the corsairs of the North African Mediterranean 
could be treated in the same way as actual pirates or as Native Americans, rather than 
being dealt with in a diplomatic manner. “In viewing the pirates as barbarians, Americans 
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evoked dark images from antiquity that they reserved for their worst enemies.”124 The 
implications of this are sinister: In the American mind, the corsairs no longer belonged to 
states that could be diplomatically reasoned with, but to a menace to be exterminated in 
the name of American freedoms
125
. 
From here, I will explain America’s official response to the Barbary threat. I have 
 
demonstrated how the Orientalist language used originally in the captivity narratives was 
later used in at least one of the main colonial newspapers as the nation approached the 
possibility of war. Now, I will use samples of the policy makers’ language to show how 
the same Orientalist slurs and ideologies found in the captivity narratives and in the 
Pennsylvania Gazette were used by officials like Thomas Jefferson to justify the 
Tripolitan and Algerine Wars with the Barbary pirates. 
 
 
 
V. Orientalism and the Barbary Wars 
 
 
There are many recent books available that are more than sufficient at explaining 
the many political nuances leading up to the two Barbary Wars, as well as the military 
tactics and battles the United States fought in the waters surrounding Tripoli and 
Algiers.
126 
Instead of repeating the information therein, I will briefly explain the conflicts 
so that I can establish a context for showing the connections between the captivity 
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narratives, the language in the Pennsylvania Gazette, and the acceptance of the 
aggressive foreign policy towards North Africa. 
As aforementioned, prior to the American Revolution American shipping had 
been protected by Britain. Britain had a long history of signing treaties with the various 
Barbary powers, and paying the tribute to ensure safety of its own commerce in the 
Mediterranean. Once the American colonies had gained their independence, the various 
Barbary powers began sanctioning their corsairs to attack ships flying the American flag, 
and demanding tribute in exchange for ceasing this behavior. For nearly thirty years, the 
young republic attempted to sign treaties, and collect the funds and presents requested by 
the regencies and Morocco to keep their shipping safe. Baepler explains that “…public 
opinion in the United States grew increasingly indignant, particularly after 1801 when 
Tripolitan corsairs seized several American ships. “Millions for defense- not one cent for 
tribute” became a popular slogan.”
127
 
 
American outrage was, of course, only one of the reasons the United States went 
to war. My argument is that the American outrage (that can be witnessed in the language 
of the Pennsylvania Gazette as well as in the writings of the founding fathers) occurred 
because of the Orientalist stereotypes perpetuated by the captivity narratives. These 
stereotypes caused a demonization of the Barbary pirates and by extension, their 
regencies/kingdoms, and allowed American to think about North Africa in terms of 
domination, rather than further negotiation. This mindset in turn caused acceptance of the 
Barbary Wars. 
“The Tripolitan War (1803-1805) marked the first prolonged engagement of the 
new U.S. Navy and demonstrated the nation’s ability to exert its will across the 
127 
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Atlantic.”128 Lambert agrees: he understands the struggle between America and Barbary 
as a struggle for the fledgling country’s prominence in the Atlantic World. It “pitted two 
marginal players in the Atlantic World against each other as each sought to better its 
position vis-à-vis Europe’s maritime powers.”129 The American captures and 
enslavements of the late eighteenth century exposed the United States as weak and 
disjointed ex-colonies of Britain. The outcome of the wars demonstrated the young 
nation’s viability and would earn it the recognition it craved on the international stage. 
Although Thomas Jefferson had a republican reputation for noninterventionism 
and a preference for peace, he believed that a naval squadron in the Mediterranean would 
be sufficient to protect American shipping there, and “was probably cheaper than making 
payments and was at least a fixed cost.”130 He thought it would be unfair to tax the nation 
for the benefit of the merchants, but eventually chose to build up the navy rather than 
continually paying tribute. At the beginning of the war, his message was clear: “Unlike 
tribute-paying Europeans, freedom-loving Americans would rid themselves of the 
piratical pestilence.” 131 
In his language, “Jefferson linked the plight of the captives to the economic 
 
imprisonment of the country.”132   He provided six reasons for going to war. Firstly, 
 
justice demanded that the captors of American citizens be punished. Secondly, America’s 
honor as a free nation required defense. Jefferson was also adamant that going to war 
would cost less than tribute and that war was at least “equally effectual” as negotiation in 
the short term, but with a higher long-term potential. Furthermore, going to war would 
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arm the federal government with “the instruments of coercion over its delinquent 
members,” and centralize the power in the federal government. In fighting Algiers, the 
United States would earn respect in Europe, which would give America advantage in 
future economic dealings with the current European superpowers
133
. One might ask: 
would these objectives have seemed plausible in justifying war with a European nation? 
John Adams, who was ardently opposed to warring with the Barbary powers 
nevertheless looked upon North Africa through Orientalist eyes, presuming that “If we 
could even send a force sufficient to burn a town
134
, their unfeeling governors would only 
insult and deride.”135 Thomas Jefferson’s reply to such ideas was that it would be 
 
humiliating to the United States to treat with “such enemies of the human race,”136 as if 
the Barbary pirates or their regencies/kingdoms were not a part of that race. 
These words express the Orientalist concepts of the captivity narratives. They 
imply that the rulers of the Barbary coast were cruel, even regarding their own citizens, 
and that they were subhuman. These ideas function as a justification for retribution and 
military action, and made Jefferson’s commerce and status-oriented reasons for declaring 
war more palatable to an American public that was used to the North Africans being 
depicted as backward savages from the very first encounters. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
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“By constructing North Africa as monstrous and by combating this so-called 
“barbarity,” Anglo-America and later the U.S. were able to portray their country as just 
and honorable.”137 This type of dichotomy is precisely what the captivity narratives and 
the Pennsylvania Gazette created with their language. The principle of Orientalism and 
Orientalist language is that the other is constructed in opposition to the self. The way in 
which American viewed the Barbary powers, therefore, allowed the young republic to 
construct itself as a free and commerce-based nation. The idea of the American identity 
as superior to that of the Barbary States allowed for America to invoke principles in its 
proto-imperialistic war with North Africa. Although America did not go on to colonize 
North Africa, it did inherit the European mentality of imperial expansion, and the 
 
Barbary Wars were one of the early manifestations of this mindset. 
Christopher Castiglia asserts that “captivity narratives were indeed circulated to 
justify imperial expansion,” and that the radical differences emphasized therein gave rise 
to imperialist hierarchies.
138 
It is important not to underestimate the power of words on 
the early American psyche. “The horrid proceedings of these merciless barbarians,”139 
elicits a profoundly different set of assumptions and emotions than, for example, a more 
neutral phrase like “the actions of the North African privateers.” The captivity narratives 
titillated and enraged readers, and shaped their condescending views of North Africa. 
These views can be traced in the evolution of their mimicry in the Pennsylvania Gazette, 
and in the language used by the policy makers throughout the course of the Barbary 
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conflicts. This, in turn helps to explain why the revolutionary American foreign policy 
did not face tremendous opposition from the public. The policies were so aggressive in 
part because of the power of the orientalist tropes about the Barbary pirates perpetuated 
by European and American captives. 
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